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NOTES
Antitrust and State Action:
Lights Out for a Regulated Utility
In Cantorv. Detroit Edison,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that a power
utility regulated by the State of Michigan is not immune from federal
antitrust liability, even though the Michigan Public Service Commission
had approved the utility's activity under attack-a light-bulb program for
customers-and the utility by state law had to maintain the program until
it filed a new tariff with the Commission. 2
The Michigan Public Service Commission pervasively controls the distribution of electricity in the state of Michigan. Under the command of the
Michigan legislature, 3 the Commission approves the rates, fees and services of every supplier of electricity within the state. The Commission does
not regulate the distribution of light bulbs, but since 1916 the approved
tariff and rate structure of respondent Detroit Edison have included a
light-bulb exchange program for Edison's customers in southeastern Michigan, where Edison is the sole supplier of electricity. The Commission has
never held hearings on the advisability of the program or considered its
impact on interstate commerce. State law was silent on the subject.'
A predecessor of Detroit Edison started the program in the late 19th
century to boost sales of electricity. Edison continued the program and, at
the time of petitioner Cantor's suit, furnished its customers light bulbs for
home or commercial use in proportion to the amount of electricity used for
lighting. 5 Since the cost of the program was included in Edison's general
rate structure,' Edison's customers were in effect forced to buy light bulbs
from the utility. In 1972 Detroit Edison furnished its five million customers
approximately 50 per cent of the standard light bulbs they used. No other
1.
- U.S. , 96 S. Ct. 3110, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1976).
2. 96 S. Ct. at 3114, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1146.
3. MICHIGAN COMPILED LAws ANNOTATED (M.C.L.A.) §460.6 (Supp. 1976). Specific restrictions and regulations on electrical utilities are contained in M.C.L.A. §§460.551 through
460.559 (1967). "The heart of the Commission's function is to regulate the 'furnishing . . .
[of] electricity for production of light, heat, or power...'." 96 S. Ct. at 3114, 49 L. Ed. 2d
at 1146.
4. 96 S. Ct. at 3113-3114, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1145, 1146.
5. New customers were given light bulbs to meet immediate needs; thereafter light bulbs
would be replaced by Detroit Edison. 96 S. Ct. at 3113 n. 5, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1145 n. 5.
6. In 1972 the program cost $2,835,000 for 18,564,381 light bulbs supplied. Large industrial
customers had been dropped from the program in 1964 with the Commission's approval. The
elimination of the service became effective as a general rate reduction for the industrial
customers. 96 S.Ct. at 3113, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1145-1146.
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utility in the state offered a similar program.
Cantor, a retail druggist who sold light bulbs, claimed that Edison was
using its monopoly powers as a regulated distributor of electricity in Michigan to restrain competition in the light-bulb market. Cantor charged that
Edison's activities violated §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act7 and §3 of the
Clayton Act" and asked for treble damages and injunctive relief., Edison
moved for summary judgment solely on the basis of its relation with and
control by the State of Michigan.' 0
The district court held that when a state agency acted affirmatively in
approving the rates and practices of a utility company, the resulting practices were state action and exempt from antitrust liability by congressional
intent." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed without
opinion the grant of summary judgment to Detroit Edison.'2 The Supreme
Court, reversing,' 3 held that the light-bulb program was private action and
7. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (Supp. 1976), provides in part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is declared to be
illegal ....
" This act makes tying arrangments unlawful; Cantor first argued this violation
in his brief to the Supreme Court. 96 S. Ct. at 3113 n. 3, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1144 n. 3. For a
brief description of tying arrangments, in which a seller of goods or a supplier of services
conditions the sale of one product on the sale of the additional, or "tied," product, see ABA,
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 7-9 (1968). See also Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 309 F. Supp. 1119 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd, 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §2 (Supp. 1976), provides in part: Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states. . . shall
be guilty of a felony ...
"
8. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §14 (1973), provides in part: "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make a sale. . . of goods...
or other commodities . . . or fix a price charged therefore . . . on the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods...
of a competitor. . . of the lessor or seller, where the effect. . . may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
9. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §26 (1973), provides that injunctive relief
against antitrust violations may be obtained by private parties. Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C.A. §15 (1973) provides that private parties injured by violations of antitrust laws
can sue for treble damages and costs, including reasonable attorney fees.
10. 96 S. Ct. at 3112-3113, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1144-1145.
11. 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The court cited Gas Light Co. of Columbus
v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), for
the proposition that meaningful regulation and supervision by the state makes the stateaction exemption from federal antitrust laws applicable. The district court in Cantor found
material the facts that the Michigan Public Service Commission derived a comprehensive
rate schedule after conducting investigations and hearings, and that the Commission ordered
the tariff carried out and thereafter supervised the utility. The court rejected Cantor's contention that the Commission must consider the effects of the tariff on interstate competition.
392 F. Supp. at 1111, 1112.
12. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
13. A plurality of four, with Chief Justice Burger concurring in parts I and III and the
judgment and Justice Blackmun concurring only in the judgment.
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that it would be neither unfair nor contrary to congressional intent to hold
Edison responsible for its activities.
The flagship of the federal antitrust laws is the Sherman Act of 1890,"
"designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."' Congress
passed the Sherman Act under its interstate commerce power'" and worded
the statute "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states,"' 7 so that its impact would
be commensurate with the reach of its commerce power." In 1890 intrastate trade and commercial activities were considered beyond congressional control," but where the commerce power did apply, regulations
passed under it prevailed over conflicting state directives. 0
The commerce power of Congress did not crystallize around 1890 standards. The Supreme Court in a series of decisions in the late 1930's and
early 1940's upheld congressional schemes to regulate areas of commerce
traditionally within the sphere of state or private control., In Parker v.
Brown 2 in 1943, given that Congress had the power to regulate the raisin
industry, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the federal antitrust
standards regulating competition would be applicable if a state purposefully foreclosed competition to achieve a state-perceived economic and
social goal.?
In Parker,the Supreme Court held that under neither the Sherman Act
14. C. 647, §§1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§1-7 (1973,
Supp. 1976). The two other mainstays of the antitrust laws are the Federal Trade Commission
Act, c. 311, §§1-18, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§41-58 (1973,
Supp. 1976), and the Clayton Act, c. 323, §§1-26, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§12-27 (1973, Supp. 1976).
15. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United Sates, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (Supp. 1976).
18. "It has been held that Congress intended the reach of the Sherman Act to expand
along with that of the commerce power. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, U.S.
n. 2, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 n. 2, 48 L. Ed. 2d [388, 343 n.2] (1976), and cases cited."
Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3124, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1141, 1158 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
19. 96 S. Ct. at 3136-3137, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1174-1175 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Slater,
Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for NarrowingParker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L.
REV. 71, 84 (1974).
20. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The secondary case under consideration in this Note, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), is better known for its discussion of
the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, §2, than for its two
pages on antitrust. See Slater, supra note 19, at 72 n. 5.
21. Most notably, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
23. Governmental regulation of commerce goes back to the Magna Carta, and the laissezfaire economic theory reflected in the antitrust laws is an upstart, according to Handler, The
Current Attack on the Parkerv. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976).
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nor the Commerce Clause" could California officials be enjoined from
maintaining a state program designed to control the market for California
raisins. Farmer Brown sought to enjoin a program set up by the cumulative
effort and initiative of both raisin growers and state agricultural officials,
who were operating under an express legislative command to restrict competition in agricultural commodities so that the agricultural wealth of the
state would be conserved. The raisin program affected interstate commerce
and therefore was within the regulatory power of Congress. 5
The Supreme Court assumed that the Sherman Act would have been
violated if private individuals had conspired to establish the marketing
program, but said that under the Constitution the states are sovereign
unless they are limited by explicit congressional action."6 The Court decided that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, had not intended to
subject the states to the restraints of the law:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restraina state or its officials from activities directed by the state legislature . . . .The Sherman Act makes no
mention of the states as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to
restrain state action or official action directed by a state.Y
The Court's rationale and its use of the phrase "state action or official
action ' 28 were broad enough to encompass the activities of private persons
acting within the framework of state law, 2 but the Court did not decide
24. The commerce question in Parker was: If Congress had not extended its power over
the interstate market for raisins, did the State of California, by establishing a marketing
program, intrude into Congress' power over interstate commerce? 317 U.S. at 359. The Court
responded that, since Congress had not exerted its powers and the state regulation concerned
local commerce even though it had an affect on interstate commerce, the power granted to
Congress and the power reserved for the states would be balanced to accommodate competing
demands. 317 U.S. at 362. This balancing of interests and the issue of Congress' preempting
state regulations is the thrust of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Cantor, 96 S.Ct. at 3124,
46 L. Ed. 2d at 1158.
25. 317 U.S. at 345-350.
26. Id. at 351.
27. Id. at 351-352 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 352.
29. The Court cited Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), to support its holding. In Olsen,
the Supreme Court said that federal antitrust laws could not be used to deny a state's lawful
regulatory powers over commerce, and that if the state has the power to regulate, no monopoly
in a legal sense can arise from the fact that only state-licensed riverboat pilots, the defendants
in the suit, could ply the waters around Texas. 195 U.S. at 345. Olsen, according to Handler,
supra note 23, at 8-9, stands for the proposition that state-directed activities cannot be the
subject of an antitrust suit. Olsen is not mentioned in the opinions for reversal in Cantor. In
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), the U.S. Government petitioned to
enjoin the merger of corporate holdings into what was alleged to be an unlawful combination
in restraint of the railroad trade. A primary defense was that all actions of the defendant were
legal under the corporate law of New Jersey. The Court said that a state could not authorize
private individuals to restrain competition. 193 U.S. at 346.
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this point, because the defendants in Parker were state officials carrying
out state law. In fact, the Supreme Court did not analyze state action
within the context of the antitrust laws for more than a quarter of a century, 10 and the state-action exemption as it relates to private persons was
left to the circuit courts to develop.
In the leading case of Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC,3
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said that the "teaching
of Parker v. Brown is that antitrust laws are directed against individual
action and not state action."3 The court defined state action as the decision by state authorities to regulate an industry and the subsequent enforcement of that regulation for some public purpose tied to the elimination of competition. State action would not become private action, the
court said, even if private persons controlled by the regulation participate
in its making and enforcement, as long as they are adequately supervised
by independent state officials. 3
The Fourth Circuit later retreated from the stringent standard for finding state action developed in Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade. In
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,3" it held that
administrative silence on a suspect activity of a regulated private utility
conferred the title of state action on the activity and therefore exempted
it from scrutiny under the federal antitrust laws. In contrast, the Fifth
Circuit, looking at a similar activity of a power utility in Gas Light Co. of
Columbus v. Georgia Power Co.,3 5 held that private commercial activity
30. Eastern Ry. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136, 137 n.
17 (1961), and Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962), are the cases in
which the antitrust holding of Parkeris more than simply referred to. Noerr and United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), stand, generally, for the proposition that group
attempts to influence legislative action or public officials, regardless of intent or purpose, are
not illegal under the Sherman Act. A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS-ANTMRUST
LAWS §§33 and 34 (1972). The reason is partly congressional intent as found in Parker and
partly a First-Amendment right to petition the government. Eastern Ry. President's Conf.
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-138 (1960). But see Slater, supra note 19, at
74 n. 13.
31. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). The court affirmed a cease-and-desist order of the Federal
Trade Commission against the Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., on findings that the
latter unreasonably restrained trade in the purchase and sale of tobacco. Id. at 505. The
defendants were operating warehouses and auctions pursuant to state law, but the Board was
formed and operated by private persons who were not supervised at all by the state. Id. at
508, 510.
32. Id. at 509.
33. Id.
34. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971), revg 309 F. Supp. 1119 (1970). The Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. had an underground residential distribution (U.R.D.) plan, by which the utility
installed underground wiring for houses if they were built total electric and in a later program
offered consumers credit on underground wiring costs based on anticipated electrical usage.
Id. at 250.
35. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). The Gas Light Co.
of Columbus complained of Georgia Power's U.R.D. plan, see supra, note 34, its rate struc-
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could become state action within the scope of Parker only if an independent governmental agency charged with overseeing the utility conducted
adversary hearings on the activity in question and exercised continued
control over the utility. As these two decisions indicate, there was no
uniform test for finding a state-action exemption from federal antitrust
law. The decisions do reflect, however, a recognition that the Parkerprinciple-Congress did not intend to subject the states to the antitrust
laws-needed effective limitation, lest the merest pretense of official state
involvement in private conduct place anticompetitive activities under the
state-action umbrella."
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,37 the Supreme Court analyzed state
action and federal antitrust laws for the first time in 33 years and held that
before any restraint on commerce can become state action and exempt
from antitrust laws, the restraint must first be required by the state acting
as sovereign. The Goldfarbs had brought suit for treble damages against a
county bar association in Virginia for setting a fee schedule and against
the Virginia State Bar for enforcing the schedule. The Court conceded that
for some purposes the Virginia State Bar was a state agency, but said that
the Bar's mandate from the Supreme Court of Virginia did not expressly
require it to enforce fee schedules. The local bar argued that it was exempt
from antitrust liability because the state bar prompted its fee schedule.
The Court responded that anticompetitive activities must be compelled by
the state as sovereign and that neither the state bar nor the local bar could
escape liability for their private anticompetitive activities.
In Cantor, decided shortly after Goldfarb, four justices agreed that the
state-action exemption of Parker is applicable only to antitrust suits
against state officials, 9 but the Chief Justice, relying on the Court's opinion in Goldfarb, said in his concurrence that the focus of the exemption is
on the activity, not the person sued. 0 The Chief Justice nevertheless found
Parker inapplicable, because Michigan had no statewide policy with respect to the market for light bulbs and was essentially neutral on the
subject.4 Justice Blackmun, concurring, 2 also thought Parkercould not be
ture, its installation practices, and its promotional schemes for housing contractors. 440 F.2d
at 1137.
36. See Slater, supra note 19, at 91.

37. 421 U.S. 773 (1974).
38. Id. at 790-791.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3117, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1150. But see Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
40. 96 S. Ct. at 3123, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1157.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 3124, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1158. See Verkuil, State Action, Due Process, and
Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975), for the suggestion
that the state-action exemption should turn partially on the procedure by which the regulation is adopted. If the state is actually involved in the decision-making process and the
decision can withstand scrutiny under due-process review, the Court should defer to the state.
Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), in which the Supreme Court invalidated
on due-process grounds action taken by a state board so permeated by private parties inter-
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limited to suits against state officials. Although there was no majority
opinion on why Detroit Edison did not fall within Parker,the combined
opinions denied the utility the state-action defense to antitrust liability.
The Court did not completely jerk the Parker rug from under Detroit
Edison's feet. The Chief Justice specifically joined the four-justice plurality43 in deciding that Edison could not be held liable for violating the
antitrust laws (1) if Edison had done nothing more than obey the commands of the state sovereign, or (2) if Edison's total compliance with the
tariff scheme approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission were
necessary to make the state regulatory act work." Edison did not meet
either criteria.
Regarding the first, the Court said, "There is nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's participation in the decision [to have the light-bulb
program] is sufficiently significant to require that its conduct in implementing the decision . . . conform to applicable federal law."'" Here, as
in other cases, the Court said, the decision to implement a program is a
blend of private and public decision-making, and if the private party exercises sufficient freedom of choice, it must take the responsibility for the
decision.46
The Court preserved the tension between state sovereignty and the supremacy of federal law in answering in the negative Edison's second possible defense. The Court recognized that not all economic regulation suppresses competition and that in cases involving a power utility, state control is necessary to protect the public from the natural monopoly of the
utility. But, the Court said, imposing antitrust standards on activities in
competitive and unregulated markets, such as the light-bulb market,
would not conflict with the state's scheme to control the natural monopoly
powers of utilities. 7 Even if there were a conflict between conduct proscribed by the federal government and that prescribed by the state, the
Court would not find an implied exemption from federal standards unless
it were absolutely necessary to make the regulatory act work. The Court
decided that Detroit Edison's compliance with the antitrust standards of
competition would not hinder the function of the Michigan Public Service
Commission .41
ested in the result that board hearings were fundamentally unfair.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3124, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1158.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 3123, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1157.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 3117-3121, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1150-1154 (Part HI).
45. 96 S. Ct. at 3119, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1152.
46. 96 S. Ct. at 3118, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1151.
47. Antitrust laws are applicable to electrical utilities. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
48. The Court said the exemption would be judged by the same standards as implied
exemptions for federal agency jurisdictions. 96 S. Ct. at 3120, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1153-1154. See
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment,49 said Congress intended
that the reach of the Sherman Act expand along with that of the commerce
power; if the power of Congress conflicts with inconsistent state laws, the
state statute becomes preempted by the federal statute. Justice Blackmun
would determine inconsistency and, hence, preemption by a rule of reason,
"taking it as a general proposition that a state-sanctioned anti-competitive
practice must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits."50
The three-justice dissent5 denounced the majority decision as a disruption of every state-regulated utility in the nation and an imposition of
treble damages on consumers. The dissent pointed out that Parker v.
Brown was authority for the Supreme Court to hold that joint attempts
by private persons to influence the passage of state laws and regulations
were exempt from antitrust laws, according to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, 52 and that the present decision could effectively overrule the entire
post-Parkercase law.
The six justices who voted to reverse the circuit court failed to agree
about why Parker v. Brown was inapplicable to this case. Even so, the
death-knell of state-action exemption to antitrust laws rings clearly. A
majority of the court rejected two broad arguments: (1) the federal standards of competition have no place in an area of the economy regulated
by the state, and (2) Congress did not intend to impose antitrust standards
on activities or persons traditionally regulated by the states.5 3 Whether
these two rejections are considered refinements or limitations on the
Parker decision, Parker's viability as the cornerstone in structuring an
antitrust defense based on state regulation is unquestionably challenged.
Because only the plurality was willing to limit Parker to suits against
state officials, the traditional state-action defense will continue to be
raised by private parties when the state or its officials have expressly
ordered the anticompetitive activity to implement a legislative objective.
49.

96 S. Ct. at 3124-3128, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1158-1163.

50. 96 S. Ct. at 3126, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1161. See Posner, The ProperRelationship Between
State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974).

51. 96 S. Ct. at 3128-3141, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1164-1179. The dissent viewed the majority
holding as a lapse back into substantive due process, in which the judiciary substitutes its
own views on the wisdom of state legislation for that of the state legislature. 96 S. Ct. at 3140,
49 L. Ed. 2d at 1178. See Verkuil, supra note 41.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 3133, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1168. See supra note 30. But see Slater, supra note
30, at 74 n. 13, which says First-Amendment rights to petition the governments were the
controlling consideration in Noerr.
53. Remarks by Donald I. Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Parker v. Brown: The Great Bicentennial Celebration (Before the Council of ABA

Public Utility Law Section, Oct. 28, 1976). According to Baker, Goldfarb, Cantor, Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
U.S. -_, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976), must be
Consumer Council, Inc., read together to learn the present Court's view toward state regulation and competition.
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But even in these situations, the analysis for determining whether an exemption exists should follow the guidelines set forth by the plurality and
Chief Justice Burger. Having already determined that no state action existed, they considered the extent of the private party's freedom of choice
in implementing the activity and the necessity of the proscribed activity
in relation to a state scheme for the protection of the public." The six
justices voting for reversal indicated that a case-by-case determination for
an exemption is in order and, with the exception of the Chief Justice, were
willing to balance the activity prescribed by the Michigan Public Service
Commission against federal standards or goals for trade and commerce as
reflected in the antitrust laws.15
The implication is that private persons cannot use the state as a tool for
fostering anticompetitive practices, even if the state sets up the machinery, as it did in Parker. The Cantor decision itself is limited to suits
against private parties when there is no state law at stake, but the decision
could be used by the Court to strike down a state law that, in the view of
the Court, unnecessarily restrains competition.
RICHARD W. PIERCE
54. Part III of the plurality opinion, 96 S. Ct. at 3117-3121, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1150-1154.
55. Justice Burger's concurrence limits his opinion to those situations in which there is
no state law on point (for example, no law on the need for regulating light bulbs). Thus, a
distinction is necessary between an activity prescribed by a state regulatory agency and an
activity prescribed by state law. Justice Blackmun makes no such distinction, and neither
does the plurality's analysis. In fact, the plurality opinion contains an analysis of the state's
need to regulate public utilities. 96 S. Ct. at 3119-3120, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1152-1153. Cf.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).

